RE: NBAR for Security Filtering

From: Scott Morris (swm@emanon.com)
Date: Wed Dec 15 2004 - 15:54:09 GMT-3


When this book and the whitepapers were first written, 'drop' was likely not
a valid entry for the policy.

Plus there is some argument about which parts of code take more processing
power to execute (which nobody will likely have a true answer that could be
released publically anyway!).

But mostly a timing thing.

Scott

-----Original Message-----
From: nobody@groupstudy.com [mailto:nobody@groupstudy.com] On Behalf Of
Lord, Chris
Sent: Wednesday, December 15, 2004 1:48 PM
To: Group Study
Subject: NBAR for Security Filtering

I was wondering whether anybody has read Deal's "Cisco Router Firewall
Security" book - section on using NBAR to filter attacks.

The method prescribed is to craft a policy map on the inbound interface
using NBAR to detect dangerous traffic (e.g. Code Red urls), mark matching
packets with a dscp value and then use an acl on the outbound interface to
detect the dscp value and deny the traffic.

Why not just drop the packets in the first place using the inbound
policy-map instead of letting it traverse the router first??

Any views out there on this??

TIA

Chris.

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